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THE USE OF DISCOVERY IN UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURTS *
By WILLIAM H. SPECK t
FIFTEEN years ago supporters of the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
incorporated in Rules 26-37 the most liberal provisions for the disclosure of
information concerning lawsuits hitherto known.1 They allowed great freedom
in discovery, first to fit discovery for a part, along with pleadings and pre-
trial conferences, in giving notice of contentions and framing issues; second
to expedite the administration of justice by making lawyers aware before
trial of the strengths and weaknesses of their own and of their opponents'
cases so that uncontested issues would be eliminated, settlements facilitated,
and trial evidence better organized; and third to make information and
evidence more equally available to all parties so that substantive legal rights
would not fail for inaccessibility of proof. Discovery was to minimize the
so-called "sporting theory of justice" by making the outcome of litigation
depend less upon both the availability of evidence and the skillful exploitation
of trial surprise.
Today, after thirteen years of experience under liberal discovery rules,
complaints are heard. It is said: (1) That discovery is expensive and time
consuming out of proportion to benefits; that depositions last weeks, interroga-
tories and admissions cover thousands of items, and motions to produce call
for tons of documents. (2) That discovery is used to pry into private affairs
not relevant and material to the litigation. (3) That dilatory discovery mo-
tions take up the judges' time and delay disposition. (4) That expensive,
dilatory, and embarrassing discovery is deliberately used to harrass the other
side into a favorable settlement. (5) That attorneys race to be first with dis-
covery to tie up the other side and saddle it with expense, defendants usually
having an unwarranted priority. (6) That, in practice, relief is unobtainable
from judges because at the discovery stage they cannot investigate either the
issues or the evidence thoroughly enough to rule effectively; judges tend to
*This article is based on information gathered by the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts in an investigation of the use of discovery in United States courts,
but the evaluations and conclusions from the data presented are not necessarily those of
the Office.
tAttorney, Division of Procedural Studies and Statistics, Administrative Office of the
United States Courts.
1. Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery before Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863 (1933);
Millar, The Mechanism of Fact-Discovery: A Study in Comparative Civil Procedure,
32 ILu. L. REv. 261, 424 (1937) ; Pike & Willis, The New Federal Depostion-Discovery
Procedure, 38 CoL. L. REv. 1179, 1436 (1938) ; Sunderland, Discovery before Trial under
the New Federal Rules, 15 TENI. L. REv. 737 (1939) ; Holtzoff, Instruments of Discovery
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 41 MIcE. L. RZv. 205 (1942) ; Dyma-SmTrr,
FmERAL EXmINATIONS BEroRE TSIAL (1939).
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say, "answer the questions and don't bother me with these details." (7) That
non-reviewable rulings on discovery are not uniform among courts, or among
different judges on the same court; that even the same judge at different times
fails to give consistent rulings; so that wrangling over discovery is en-
couraged. (8) That suits are tried by deposition or other discovered materials
without the prophylactic influence of observing the witness under cross-ex-
amination. (9) That perjury is promoted both by furnishing the information
with which an unscrupulous party can fabricate a convincing story and by
reducing the opportunity to surprise the perjurer with contradictory evidence.
And (10) that lawyers use discovery to take advantage of the trial prepara-
tions of the other side so that careful investigation is unrewarded and intra-
organization reports cannot be frank. These allegations appeared in testimony
before Congress 2 and were documented in articles and comment.
3
This disquieting contrast between glowing hopes and alleged sordid reali-
ties prompted the Administrative Office of the United States Courts at the
suggestion of Judge Charles E. Clark of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit to investigate so far as limited time and resources
permitted the use of discovery in federal district courts. This investigation
has covered to varying extents the District of Columbia, Maryland, Alexandria
in the Eastern District of Virginia, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(Philadelphia), the Southern District of New York, and the Eastern Division
of the Northern District of Illinois (Chicago). The sources of information
were: (1) An examination of the dockets of cases filed in a fiscal year, usually
1948, for those showing some sign of discovery activity. See Tables 1 and 2,
pages 1135 and 1137 (2) A search of the files for further information on a
limited number of cases for each type of discovery.4  See Tables 3-6, pages
1139, 1145, 1147, and 1149. (3) Interviews with twenty lawyers active in
2. See testimony of Walton Hamilton, Hearings before Subcommittee on Study of
Monopoly Power of the Committee of the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. 285-99 (1949).
3. Caskey & Young, Some Further Comments upon Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 33 VA. L. REv. 125 (1947) ; Tactical Use and Abuse of Depositions under
the Federal Rules, 59 YALE L.J. 117 (1949); Dike, A Step Backward in the Federal
Courts: Are We Returning to Trial by Deposition?, 37 A.B.A.J 17 (Jan. 1951) ; Whitney,
The Trial of an Anti-Trust Case, 5 THE REcoRD OF THE AssocIATIoN OF THE Ba OF
NEW YORK 449, 464 (1950) ; Dawson, Examinations before Trial in the State Courts and
Depositions in the Federal Courts, 6 id. at 12 (1951); Yudldn, Some Refilnements in
Federal Discovery Procedure, 11 FED. B.J. 289 (1951). Compare generally favorable
evaluations in KocH, DEPOSlrOxNS AND DIscovERY UNDER THE FEDERAL RuIzs (Practicing
Law Institute, Trial Practice Series, No. 8, 1946) ; Freedman, Discovery as an; Instrumnent
of Justice, 22 TEmP. L.Q. 174 (1948); Cushman, Depositions in Practice, 3 MIAMI L.Q.
378 (1949).
4. These cases were chosen at random by beginning with the first docket number in
which the docket showed use of discovery and continuing so far as time permitted until
100 or more items of each type of discovery had been found or the cases exhausted. The
selection included the following:
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the federal courts for both plaintiffs and defendants and in both business and
tort litigation concerning patterns of use and abuse of discovery which they
had observed in their practice. (4) Correlation of the above information
with data on the cases in each district already available in the Administrative
Office.5
An investigation largely limited to discovery in court records is necessarily
incomplete because much discovery is carried on formally without filing
papers or informally without any papers. But further investigation outside
the records would be extremely time consuming in proportion to the data
obtainable and would raise questions of how much should be included. For
example, should such a study count the furnishing of the names of eye wit-
nesses over the telephone when both attorneys knew the information could
be required by interrogatory? And how should such a study count the furnish-
ing of the statements of witnesses to forestall taking their depositions? Except
as noted, information on discovery based on the court records is believed to
be representative of all discovery.
USE OF DISCOVERY
The federal discovery rules are popular; the dockets show their use in
over 25% of the cases filed. This percentage figure should be appraised with
due allowance that many cases filed are never seriously pressed and that it
does not include a large amount of both discovery carried on without filing
papers and information furnished voluntarily under pressure of the rules. Dis-
covery was most popular in Philadelphia where 37% of the cases disclosed its
use. See Table 1, page 1135. It was least popular in the District of Columbia,
probably because many local jurisdiction cases including divorce do not re-
quire discovery investigation. Part of the difference between districts may be
attributed to the types of cases filed: for example, while discovery is seldom
employed in the large number of habeas corpus cases in Chicago it is used
Production or
District Depositions Interrogatories Inspection Admissions
N. Y. So. 1948 ........ 101 167 76 34
Pa. E. 1948 ........... 108* 113 32* 73*
Md. 1947-48 .......... 69* 93* 35* 51*
Va. E. 1947-50 ........ 27* 13* 8* 27*
Ill. N. 1948 ........... 86* 131 85* 103*
Total ............ 391 517 236 288
For the starred (*) items the selection included all of that type of discovery found in the
files for the years and districts indicated.
5. Earlier studies of the use of discovery including some statistics are RAGLAND, Dis-
covERY BEFORE TRIAL (1932); STOCKMAN, SOiMiE STATISTICAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE
OPERATION OF DISCOVERY AND RELATED PROVISIONS OF TEE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE (typewritten study in the Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
1942) ; Tactical Use and Abuse of Depositions under the Federal Rules, 59 YAE :L.J. 117
(1949). The statistical findings of this study are corroborated in most respects by those
of Mr. Stockman.
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extensively in the large number of Jones Act cases in Philadelphia. Part seems
to be attributable to the liberality of the judges toward discovery: for example,
the extensive use of interrogatories and other discovery devices in Philadel-
phia probably results from both the use of interrogatories to get copies ot
statements and that court's coolness toward restrictions on inquiry.6
Among discovery devices the deposition is most popular. It was found in
14% of the cases, but was surprisingly close pressed by interrogatories in
13% of the cases. Interrogatories actually were more popular than depositions
in Philadelphia and Maryland. Motions to produce were found in only 4%
of the cases, requests for admissions in only 3%, and motions for physical
examinations scarcely appeared at all. The use of all these devices was cer-
tainly greater than the dockets showed; for many depositions are taken by
agreement of the parties without filing either notices or transcripts. In addition,
much information and many documents requestable by interrogatories or
producible on motion are furnished voluntarily, and both physical examina-
tions and medical reports are usually made without resort to the courts.
Use of discovery was not uniform in the various types of cases. See Table
2 page 1137. Among United States Plaintiff cases, discovery was used com-
paratively little. It was used in only 11% of these cases, and then chiefly
in OPA-Rent Control cases (23%) with many admissions, and to a lesser
extent in both contract suits and the miscellaneous "other" category. Among
United States Defendant cases, discovery was resorted to in 16% of the cases.
But this more extensive use was largely confined to Tort Claims Act suits
(30%) and the "other" category, largely tort suits in Admiralty.
The use of discovery in Tort Claims Act suits is only illustrative of its
e.xtensive utilization in all tort litigation: whether under Federal Question
jurisdiction in Federal Employers' Liability Act, (FELA), (44%) or Jones
Act (43%) suits or under Diversity jurisdiction in personal injury motor
vehicle (34%) or other (48%o) suits. The greatest use of discovery in any
district in any one type of suit was in 72% of the Jones Act suits filed at
Philadelphia. Considering that much discovery does not appear in the records
and that many suits are quickly dismissed or never seriously pushed, it is
believed that discovery is employed in virtually every seriously contested
tort case in Philadelphia and New York and in most of such suits in Maryland.
Virginia, and Chicago.
Among Federal Question cases, discovery was used in a third of the cases.
It was most frequently employed in tort suits, but use was also extensive in
Federal specialties: copyright (41%), patent, (267) and Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act, (FLSA), (42%). In habeas corpus cases, where discovery ought
6. Hickman v. Taylor, 4 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1945), rev'd, 153 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.
1945) and 329 U.S. 495 (1947) ; De Bruce v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 6 F.R.D. 403 (E.D.
Pa. 1947), overruled in Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1950); Nedimyer
v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 6 F.R.D. 21 (E.D. Pa. 1946) ; Love v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
8 F.R.D. 583 (E.D. Pa. 1948); Brauner v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468 (E.D. Pa.
1950) ; Mandel v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
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* See footnote to Table 1 for the sources of this table and the number of cases from each district.
The District of Columbia was omitted from this and subsequent tables because of its special
jurisdiction and different type of judicial business.
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to prove helpful, it is almost never used (.3%) apparently because indigent
prisoners lack means to employ the devices. Among Diversity cases discovery
use was the highest for any type of jurisdiction (39%). It was again most
extensively used in tort cases. In personal injury suits not involving a motor
vehicle, for example, 48% showed some employment of discovery. But use
was also heavy in business cases, especially contract (38%) and "other"
Diversity (39%). Among Admiralty cases, use of discovery except for inter-
rogatories use was below average (18%).
We turn now from the use of discovery in various types of suits to the
five discovery devices themselves.
Depositions
Deposition, the most popular discovery device, 7 was found in 14% of the
cases filed. Its popularity included not only tort cases under the Tort Claims
Act (23%), FELA (25%), and Jones Act (28%), and in Diversity personal
injury motor vehicle (22%) and other (35%), but also business cases such
as copyright (34%), patent (18%), insurance (21%), contract (32%),
and "other" Diversity (26%). This popularity extended not only to the
number of cases in which the deposition was employed but also to the degree
of utilization in these cases. Thousands of pages of depositions were taken
in the New York Investment Bankers anti-trust case; about a hundred depo-
sitions appear to have been taken in both the New York Ferguson v. Ford
Motor Co. (Civ. 44-482) and Kaiser-Frazer v. Otis (Civ. 45-564) cases;
and a defendant proposed to take 307 depositions in a Chicago Taft-Hartley
case. Such extensive use has been criticized.8
But the deposition is also the most expensive and burdensome discovery
device. It requires the presence of witness, reporter, and lawyers; necessi-
tates payment of witness, reporter, and transcription fees; and sometimes
involves travel expenses for lawyers and witnesses.
The deposition is most often a weapon of defendants but not overwhelm-
ingly so. See Table 3 page 1139. This Table, based on depositions filed,
actually shows more depositions taken by plaintiffs than by defendants.
Plaintiffs seem to file depositions more often than do defendants for use in
evidence. Counts in New York and Chicago of notices to take depositions as
well as depositions filed revealed greater use by defendants. Many large
corporations which are frequent defendants in tort suits-railroad, shipping,
taxicab, and insurance companies-make a general practice of taking the
deposition of the plaintiff as soon as they file their answer. And they often
take the depositions of all important witnesses from whom they do not have
signed statements.
7. The deposition probably received its greatest publicity when Whittaker Chambers,
at a deposition in a civil libel suit, produced the secret State Department papers that con-
victed Alger Hiss. Hiss v. Chambers, 8 F.R.D. 480 (D. Md. 1948).
S. Whitney, supra note 3, at 467; United States v. Morgan, 10 F.R.D. 240, 243 (1950).
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The opposite party or an agent entitled to speak for him was a witness in
almost one third of the depositions. This proportion is probably too high
because of the liberal provisions for the use of depositions of the opposite
party in evidence under Rule 26(d) (2). The opposite party appeared as
deposition witness especially often in copyright, FLSA, and contract cases.
This is to be expected because few other than party witnesses to the transac-
tions are involved in such cases.
Depositions are probably taken of witnesses residing outside the district
in only about one quarter of the cases. Here again, the data is somewhat
misleading; the depositions found in the files were most often taken outside
the district because such depositions are more likely to be admissible in
evidence and therefore filed. And the other side may not be present at
distant deposition takings to waive filing. But notices to take depositions
give more representative data. Counts including notices to take depositions
as well as depositions filed showed that only one ninth of the New York
depositions, only one fifth of the Philadelphia depositions, and less than one
third of the Chicago depositions were taken outside the district. The expense
of outside depositions can be minimized by taking them on written interroga-
tories, but only 43 of 204 outside depositions were so taken. Travel and
attorney expense for outside depositions can either seriously burden a poor
party or handicap him by obliging him to forego cross-examination. But the
courts in Philadelphia and New York have ameliorated this problem for poor
parties by requiring the party proposing an outside deposition to take it on
written interrogatories or to pay the expense of attendance for the other
party's counsel.9 Occasionally, in Philadelphia, judges have also authorized
cross-examination by written interrogatories following an opportunity to read
the transcript of the oral direct examination.
Despite the overwhelming use of depositions in the big cases mentioned,
typical use is quite modest. The average number of depositions per case was
less than two, and the median length of the depositions was only 35 pages.10
9. Gibson v. International Freighting Corp., 8 F.R.D. 487 (E.D. Pa. 1947), af'd, 173
F. 2d 591 (3d Cir. 1949); cf. Jones v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 10 F.R.D.
153 (E.D. Pa. 1950) ; see Fred Benioff Co. v. McCulloch, 133 F.2d 900 (9th Cir. 1943).
Civil Rule 12, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, ex-
pressly authorizes the court to require pre-payment of expenses for depositions more than
150 miles from New York; Fairwater Transp. Co. v. Chris-Craft Corp., 1 F.R.D. 509
(S.D. N.Y. 1940); Houghton Mifflin Co. v. Stackpole Sons, 1 F.R.D. 506 (S.D. N.Y.
1940); Moore v. George A. Hormel, 2 F.R.D. 340 (S.D. N.Y. 1942); Stevens v. Minder
Const. Corp., 3 F.R.D. 498 (S.D. N.Y. 1943); Moore v. George A. Hormel & Co., 4
F.R.D. 15 (S.D. N.Y. 1942); Boiczuk v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 5 F.R.D. 18 (S.D.
N.Y. 1944).
10. A deposition is here taken as whatever the reporter paged continuously and bound
together as one document, so that a deposition may include more than one witness. In
the comparatively few depositions containing testimony of more than one witness, the
witnesses were always examined consecutively at the same place. Therefore, treating
their combined testimony as one deposition seems a more accurate unit for measuring
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Fewer than one tenth of the depositions were 100 or more pages long. The
longest, 525 pages, was used in a New York contract case. The average
number of pages of depositions per case in cases using depositions was only
44 pages for FELA cases, 80 pages for Jones Act cases, 106 pages for contract
cases, 39 pages for personal injury motor vehicles cases, and 61 pages for
other personal injury cases. Translating these lengths into time and trans-
cription cost at the rate of 30 pages per hour and 75 cents per page for original
copy, the median deposition took slightly over one hour and cost about $25
for transcription plus the expense of travel, witnesses, and counsel. Standard
counsel fee for taking a deposition seems to be $50. The longer depositions
seem to be more common in copyright, FLSA, contract, and the miscellaneous
"other" Federal Question and Diversity cases.
Objections or other applications for court relief appeared in about one
fourth of the depositions, most often in Jones Act, FLSA, contract, and
certain personal injury cases. This high proportion is probably misleading
because depositions which become controversial are more likely to find their
way into the files than those which are taken in harmony.
Lawyers generally stated that they seldom used depositions as evidence
because they preferred to have the trier of facts hear their examination or
cross-examination. However, a search of the trial clerk's minutes in the
Southern District of New York for July through December 1950 showed use
of 133 depositions in 45 out of the 150 trials held during this period (or more
accurately in 45 out of 103 trials excluding 47 short OPA-Rent trials). Use
in evidence was most extensive in Jones Act and Admiralty trials. A similar
search in Maryland for the period July 1950 through April 1951 revealed the
use of 55 depositions in 22 out of 77 trials, principally in patent, contract,
and Diversity personal injury cases. The appendices to briefs in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit containing crucial evidence
disclosed reliance on depositions in perhaps one fifth of the cases. Thus
depositions are probably employed in only about one third of the trials.
And the limitations of their use under Rule 26(d) (3) to situations where
the witness cannot be produced in court is emphasized by the greater degree
of use in New York Admiralty trials where witnesses are often scattered
throughout the world.
Apart from the very extensive use by defendants to take the deposition
of the plaintiff immediately after answer-often by notice attached to the
answer-no general pattern in the use of depositions was observed. In a
Jones Act suit the plaintiff may be questioned about the accident, his injuries,
and his employment before and after the injury; the purser, usually in charge
of first aid, testifies to first symptoms and treatment; the master describes
the burden upon the parties and attorneys than the perhaps technically more accurate
breaking up of the document among the witnesses. If a deposition were defined as the
testimony of one witness, the median length of depositions would be somewhat shorter
and the average number per case somewhat larger.
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the operation in which the accident occurred and what was done for the
injured man; doctors describe treatments and give opinions on disability; etc.
In business cases depositions typically involve questioning witnesses at length
concerning commercial transactions and cross-examining them on numerous
papers and records.
Interrogatories
One of the biggest surprises is the usefulness, popularity, and versatility
of the old written interrogatory to the parties. Its chief advantage is cheapness
and convenience. Interrogatories were found in 13% of the cases, in almost as
many cases as depositions. In fact, they were more popular than depositions
in Philadelphia and Maryland. They were used most often in Fair Labor
Standards Act (33%), Federal Employers Liability Act (26%), and Jones
Act (22o) cases and to a lesser extent in patent, Admiralty, and Diversity
personal injury cases.
Interrogatories were used most commonly as "ground bfeakers" in tort
cases in order to get the names both of eye witnesses and other employees,
details of equipment, reports, etc. In most extreme form the plaintiff in a
Philadelphia FELA or Jones Act case might call upon the defendant to "state
all the facts" he knows about the case and to attach copies of all reports."'
And defendant would answer by saying he had no information except as
contained in attached reports or statements. These preliminary interrogatories,
varying from one to thirty or more questions, sought to elicit for the plaintiff
all that the defendant knew about the accident and to furnish leads for more
detailed investigation by deposition or motion to produce. Similarly New York
retail stores, defendant in personal injury suits, filed interrogatories asking
for the date of the accident, where it occurred, particular respects in which
defendant is claimed to have been negligent, injuries received, length of con-
finement in the hospital and time away from work, extent and permanence
of present incapacity, doctors' bills, and other special damages. Such an
interrogatory amounts to a request for a bill of particulars. In addition,
when a defendant interposes frivolous denials, detailed interrogatories can
dispose of uncontested issues. For example, if a FELA case defendant denies
everything except employment of the plaintiff, questions concerning the track
11. E.g. in No. 9187 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania the interrogatory read:
"State all of the facts relating to the defense of the plaintiff's claim for injury and
disability, which is the subject matter of this litigation as to which you, your attorney,
or any other representatives have information, including all of the facts relating to
the injuries, disability and treatments. Attach to your answer to this Interrogatory
copies of all statements, documents, papers and reports, not privileged, having any
relation to or containing any facts relating to the subject matter of this litigation."
Since Alltmont v. U. S., 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1950), copies of statements cannot be
demanded by interrogatory. These "state all the facts" interrogatories were designed to
avoid dozens of separate interrogatories covering the same ground that are more burden-
some to prepare and answer.
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on which plaintiff was working and the number, origin, and destination of
trains using that track often lead defendant to admit plaintiff was working
in interstate commerce.
Plaintiffs in private anti-trust cases have used interrogatories to get infor-
mation that would neither be known by any witness nor be available in any
document. For example, they have asked defendant moving picture distribu-
tors for titles of all pictures shown at theaters serviced over a period of years,
for box office receipts and film rentals, for seating capacity and other theater
appointments that led to the preference of one movie house over another,
for names of persons conducting picture negotiations, etc. Some defendants
have objected to the labor of compiling this information; but plaintiffs'
attorneys have pointed out that if they asked for the books and compiled the
information themselves, defendants would be obliged to go to as much trouble
and expense to check the compilation. Motions to produce and depositions
are then used to follow up on data disclosed by the interrogatories, and
requests for admissions are used to tie together all information obtained.
Though objections to interrogatories calling for research and investigation
are frequently raised, such interrogatories are now often permitted.12
In Admiralty, interrogatories are the primary method of inquiry be-
cause of custom, cheapness, convenience, and the doubtful legal status of
depositions."
The only general pattern of the abuse of discovery appeared in the use of
interrogatories in FLSA cases involving portal-to-portal and overtime-on-
overtime issues. These cases were typically brought by hundreds or thousands
of individual plaintiffs against one or more stevedoring or shipping firms.
The defendants almost invariably served interrogatories, with their answers
or soon thereafter, calling upon the plaintiffs' attorneys to give the name,
address, social security number, company number, periods of employment,
and customs of employment as to each plaintiff or each plaintiff claimed to
have been employed by the particular defendant. Theoretically plaintiffs
should be able to make their claims specifically in terms of hours worked on
particular days, but these plaintiffs were uneducated workmen whose employ-
ment had shifted frequently-in the case of stevedores, perhaps from day to
day-and who had kept no records and could not possibly remember their
work hours over the several years in litigation. The defendants, who could
obtain this information from their own records, could not have seriously
expected the plaintiffs to furnish it. Thus such interrogatories were probably
filed to harrass the plaintiffs and gain advantage in relief under Rule 37.
In certain New York cases the plaintiffs retaliated by asking for 33 items
of information relating to hours and shifts worked, cargo handled, customers
12. MooR.'s FDmA. PRActicE § 33.20 (1950); cf. United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp., 76 F. Supp. 315, 317 (D. Mass. 1948) (judge suggested research might
be made available as quid pro quo for limiting production).
13. Compare Mercado v. U. S., 184 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1950) with Dowling v. Isthmian
S.S. Co., 184 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1950).
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served, etc. for each of 5000 plaintiffs. Here the burden upon defendants
of answering, if their records even contained the information, would be
tremendous. These questions should have been handled by thorough in-
vestigation of a few selected employees, the results as to these to govern
the others.
The interrogatory is primarily a plaintiff's weapon, except in FLSA and
contract suits. See Table 4 page 1145. Note that the over-all number of
interrogatories presented by defendants is increased in this study by the
unusual number of FLSA cases. The number of items was generally quite
small-the median was about 2014 -and the number would have been even
smaller if it had not been for the heavy representation of ,LSA cases in
which a few questions applied to each of a large number of plaintiffs. Apart
from FLSA cases large numbers of questions were asked only in patent,
miscellaneous "other" Federal Question cases and Diversity contract and
personal injury cases other than motor vehicle. Only slightly over half of
the interrogatories appear to have been answered; in the remainder answers
were made informally, answering was excused on objection, or the questions
were abandoned. Out of 276 interrogatories answered only 72 answers were
made within the 15 days allowed by Rule 33. Interrogatories are much more
numerous and require more labor to answer than the rules contemplated,
and in any large organization even simple questions may require longer than
15 days to answer.
Interrogatories seem to generate an unwarrantedly large number of objec-
tions and applications to the court. Objections or some other form of applica-
tion to the court or action by the court appeared in well over one third of the
interrogatories, particularly in FELA, FLSA, Jones Act, contract, and per-
sonal injury cases other than motor vehicle. The large number of objections
to interrogatories is confirmed by an examination of the motion calendars:
one fifth of the matters on the argument lists at Philadelphia during the
calendar year 1950 and 16% of the matters on the motion calandars in
New York during January and February 1951 dealt with interrogatories.
The reasons for the number of objections to interrogatories may be surmised.
Since the questions are set forth, the scope of inquiry is apparent and objec-
tions for relevance are encouraged; some fear that answering will waive
objections.Yr Furthermore the short time limits to object and answer seem to
encourage hasty objections, in some instances simply to gain time.
14. Compare Judge Chesnut's frequently quoted admonition in Coca Cola Co. v.
Dixie-Cola Laboratories, 30 F. Supp. 275 (D. Md. 1939), that interrogatories be limited
to the few important facts and should rarely number more than 15 or 20; Caskey &
Young, Some Limitations upon Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 VA.
L. Rxv. 348 (1942) ; Caskey & Young, supra note 3.
15. National Transformer Corp. v. France Mfg. Co., 9 F.R.D. 606, 607 (N.D.
Ohio 1949).
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Motions for Production or Inspection
Motions for production or inspection, numerically of little importance,
appeared in only 4% of the cases filed. But much material is voluntarily
furnished by attorneys, particularly in Jones Act and Federal Employers
Liability Act suits where a few plaintiff's counsel are constantly dealing with
a few defendant's counsel. In addition similar materials may often be obtained
more easily by subpoena duces tecum under Rule 45(d)(1), because it is
not necessary to go to the judge and show good cause. Furthermore, in
Philadelphia prior to the Alltmont case copies of statements could be obtained
by interrogatories.
These motions were made overwhelmingly by plaintiffs in almost every
category of suit. See Table 5 page 1147. The materials sought were almost
always papers of some sort: record books, documents, files, photographs, etc.
Remaining motions sought inspection of such property as models, machines,
samples of material, real estate, or a steam ship when next in port. In some
instances a motion may verge upon either an interrogatory if it calls for the
production of a paper giving certain information and no existing paper gives
that information, or upon a deposition if it calls upon the other side to
produce an employee for oral examination. The plaintiff in a Jones Act case
may ask for all statements of the plaintiff or witnesses, log entries, medical
reports, Coast Guard reports, statements of the master, and all other reports
in the regular course of business. In a civil rights suit to correct unequal
facilities in segregated Virginia schools the plaintiffs sought enrollment and
attendance records, accounts of tuition paid for attendance outside the country,
school census by race and age, records of teacher qualifications and salaries,
courses offered, capital investment in school facilities, costs of operation, and
the right to inspect school premises. Three fifths of the motions were granted;
in the remainder the motion was denied, abandoned, or acquiesced in by the
other party.
Motions for Physical Examination
Motions for physical examinations rarely appear on the dockets, apparently
because when the right is clear, as it usually is, voluntary arrangements are
made for examinations. Such arrangements have been encouraged by decisions
that voluntary submission does not waive the right to copies of medical
reports. 6 In New York defendants often accompany their answers with a
"notice" to examine the plaintiff both orally and physically. Some maritime
defendants make a general practice of taking physical examinations of living
plaintiffs. In practice, motions are confined to personal injury and particularly
to Diversity personal injury cases. The defendants in Federal Question per-
16. Kelleher v. Cohoes Trucking Co. Inc., 25 F. Supp. 965 (S.D. N.Y. 1938):
Rutherford v. Alben, 1 F.R.D. 277 (S.D. W.Va. 1940); Lipshitz v. Bleyhl, 5 F.R.D.
225 (E.D. N.Y. 1946).
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sonal injury cases under the Federal Employers Liability Act and Jones Act
are employers and often have other means of getting medical examinations of
plaintiffs. In one case a plaintiff unsuccessfully sought the physical examina-
tion of a crane operator whose negligence was alleged to have caused his
injury. In almost every other instance the defendant took the medical ex-
amination of the plaintiff.
Requests for Admissions
Requests for admissions are little used and appeared in only 3% of the
cases. They were used most often in government OPA-Rent Control suits
(20%) and to a lesser extent in government contract suits (6%), copyright
(7%), and Diversity insurance cases (7%). One limitation on their use may
be that the words "a written request" in Rule 36 are understood to limit a
party without the court's permission, to one request. But some requests often
amounted to a step by step development of a plaintiff's case. In OPA cases,
for example, the government sought admissions concerning registration state-
ments, rent orders, the landlord, his agents, tenants, rents paid, and the
absence of refunds or suits for refunds. Upon the answers to these requests
or upon the failure to answer, the government frequently moved for summary
judgment. In a Jones Act suit the plaintiff may seek admissions as to his
employment, the ship's location, his injury, the treatment, his efforts to work,
and the maintenance and cure received.
Requests for admissions were almost always sought by plaintiffs. See Table
6 page 1149. The only exception was in Diversity personal injury motor
vehicle cases. The number of items in requests was quite small-the median
was only about 13. Only 23 requests covered 50 or more items, and 19 of these
were in government OPA cases where the number of tenancies was large.
Two-thirds of the admissions were answered, and the remainder might be
deemed admitted by virtue of Rule 36. Objections or other court activity ap-
peared in fewer than one-quarter of the requests. But the over-all proportion
of objection was probably smaller, for while all objected-to requests were likely
to appear in the files, it was unlikely that all those not objected to would appear.
CONCLUSION
Are the Criticisms of Discovery Valid?
The best testimonial to the worth of discovery is the extent of its voluntary
use. Some form of discovery appears to be used in virtually all seriously
contested tort cases and in most of the many categories of business cases.
Moreover, most lawyers like liberal discovery: those representing plaintiffs
in tort cases were heartily enthusiastic; some of those representing defendants
were equally favorable, although some were lukewarm or doubtful; and a few
representing defendants in business litigation had criticisms. Lawyers criti-
cal of discovery said that they were constantly going through their files to
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prepare for discovery proceedings and that the resulting expense in many
small cases was out of proportion to the value. Others said that corporate
defendants could give but not get discovery information because their clients
could not afford and would not be allowed to practice the kind of evasions
that were almost regarded as praiseworthy in plaintiffs.
The cost of discovery is not exorbitant. In the ordinary tort case full
investigation by deposition might result in taking the testimony of four or
five witnesses, probably all within the district, over a period of four or five
hours for a total of approximately 150 pages. This would cost the examiner
perhaps $100 for the reporter and transcription and, allowing $50 per deposi-
tion for attorney fees, another $200 for his lawyer. In these personal injury
cases interrogatories, requests for admissions, and motions to produce should
cause only negligible expense. In the ordinary business case depositions might
be somewhat longer because of the number of transactions involved. Produc-
tion of files might also cause some expense and inconvenience. In the gigantic
business case, expense would be much greater. Motions to produce call for
tons of files; interrogatories require extensive research; and depositions run
to thousands of pages. But these cases are few and atypical, and the amount
of discovery in them is probably not out of proportion to the sums of money
at stake. If 100 to 150 pages of depositions are reasonable in a tort case worth
$20,000, then 100,000 to 150,000 pages would not be out of proportion in a
case worth $20,000,000. Discovery expense in giant cases can probably only
be minimized by the intervention of the judge, at an early stage, in order to
organize the discovery activities of both parties, with a view to bringing out
information economically.1 7 Judges are aware of the cost of discovery and
try to minimize expense.' 8
Some criticism arises from the fact that the party seeking discovery is not
responsible for the trouble and expense of getting the information requested.
In some instances the information sought is difficult and expensive to obtain
and of slight relevance; and yet, since the attorney demanding the informa-
tion does not bear the expense of getting it, that expense does not temper
his demands. The result is a certain amount of maneuvering to put the burden
of preparing the case upon the other side, as is perhaps illustrated in the
Fair Labor Standards Act cases already discussed. 9
17. Whitney, supra note 3. A committtee of the Judicial Conference under the
chairmanship of Judge Prettyman has been studying the trial problems of big cases.
18. See cases in note 9 supra and United States v. National City Bank, 1 F.R.D.
367 (S.D. N.Y. 1940); Sullivan v. Southern Pacific Co., 7 F.R.D. 206 (S.D. N.Y.
1947) ; Butts v. Southern Pacific Co., 7 F.R.D. 194 (S.D. N.Y. 1947); Isbrandsten v.
Moller, 7 F.R.D. 188 (S.D. N.Y. 1947); Frito Co. of Cleveland v. Morton Salt Co.,
10 F.R.D. 384 (N.D. Ohio 1950); Savannah Theatre Co. v. Lucas & Jenkins, 10 F.R.D.
461 (N.D. Ga. 1943).
19. E.g. O'Malley v. Chrysler Corp., 160 F.2d 35 (7th Cir. 1947); Brown v. Dunbar
& Sullivan Dredging Co., 8 F.R.D. 107, 105 (W.D. N.Y. 1948).
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Apparently, discovery is not used to pry into private affairs. Occasionally
it is said that a suit is a mere pretense to take advantage of discovery, and
that parallel suits are brought in state and federal courts to take advantage
of more liberal federal discovery. No such instances were found, and the
attorneys mentioned "prying" more as a theoretical possibility than as an ac-
tuality. Persons from whom discovery is sought fear that it will bring out
illegal activities, trade secrets, or simply embarrassing facts. Unfortunately
when a person becomes involved in litigation much material that he would
ordinarily like to keep private becomes of judicial concern, and the person
subject to discovery is likely to value his desire for privacy higher than he
values the judicial interest in full disclosure. Judges endeavor to limit dis-
covery to the needs of the lawsuit 20 and have declined to permit use of
federal discovery for ulterior purposes.21 But the probability that litigation
will bring out relevant material that a party would prefer to keep hidden
certainly influences decisions to sue or to settle.
Dilatoriness of discovery is scarcely a problem in metropolitan districts
where a judge is always available to decide discovery motions, 22 and where
getting to trial takes months or years because of crowded calendars. But it
is sometimes a problem in courts without a resident judge, for an objection
to discovery with a demand for oral argument may delay proceedings until
the next term and may postpone trial for one or more terms. Nevertheless,
discovery motions seem to be taking more judge time than they should. Of
1,110 matters on the motion calendars in New York during January and Feb-
ruary 1951, 40% dealt with some type of discovery; 16% dealt with interroga-
tories, 13% with depositions, 10% with motions to produce, and 1% with
admissions. Other districts where the data could be obtained confirmed this
story. In Philadelphia, 28% of the matters on the argument lists during the
calendar year 1950 dealt with discovery and 20% dealt with interrogatories.
In Maryland, of the matters on the motion calendars for July 1950 through
April 1951, 21% dealt with some type of discovery, 10% dealt with motions
to produce, 9% with interrogatories, and 1.5% with depositions. Even if the
time required for disposition of discovery motions is less than that required
for other types of motions, the number of motions dealing with discovery
seems excessive.
20. Cooney v. Guild Co., 1 F.R.D. 246 (S.D. N.Y. 1940); Smith, Kline & French
Laboratories v. Lannett Co., 3 F.R.D. 51 (E.D. Pa. 1943) ; Swoboda v. Carton Finishers,
6 F.R.D. 600 (N.D. Ill. 1946); Remington Rand Inc. v. Control Instrument Co., 7
F.R.D. 18 (E.D. N.Y. 1947); Caplin v. United Feature Syndicate, Inc., 8 F.R.D. 424
(S.D. N.Y. 1948); Garrett v. Faust, 8 F.R.D. 556 (E.D. Pa. 1949); Hen-Ray Food
Markets, Inc. v. Great American Indemnity Co., 8 F.R.D. 549 (E.D. Pa. 1949);
Cresmer v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 203 (E.D. N.Y. 1949); G. & P. Amusement Co. v.
Regent Theater Co., 9 F.R.D. 721 (N.D. Ohio 1949); cf. Ferguson v. Ford Motor Co.,
8 F.R.D. 414 (S.D. N.Y. 1948).
21. See Moon's FEDERAL PRAcTIcE § 26.14 (1950).
22. In New York many depositions are taken in the Federal court house so that a
judge can be reached quickly. Kirshner v. Palmer, 7 F.R.D. 252 (S.D. N.Y. 1945).
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For cases in Maryland and Chicago a comparison was made between those
using and not using discovery as to all cases disposed of both before and
after trial, with regard to the time elapsing from filing to termination. The
results show that the disposition of cases with discovery takes longer than
do those without discovery. The connection may not be a causal one, for
discovery is probably most frequently used in stubbornly contested cases.
But discovery activity necessarily takes some time, and the advantages of
discovery undoubtedly lead many plaintiffs to undertake much of their
case investigation after filing suit rather than before, so that some delays
resulting from discovery would be expected.
LawTers agreed that discovery devices are used in some cases to harass
the other side into a settlement-"to create an atmosphere for settlement" as
one phrased it-but they were unable to estimate the extent of this abuse.
Harassment may take the form of long time-wasting depositions of important
officers, 23 of multiplying expense by hundreds of distant depositions, of
interrogatories calling for thousands of information items, of demands for
tons of business files, or of prying into irrelevant and embarrassing private
matters. Occasionally applications to take, within the district, the deposi-
tions of non-resident parties seem to be for the purpose of harassment.2 4
One attorney stated that the possibility of prolonged discovery before trial
made him hesitate to accept retainers from persons with limited means
because, although he could reasonably estimate the time required for other
aspects of the case, he could not forecast the time required for discovery.
Except for the FLSA cases already mentioned, this study revealed no
general harassment. The potential field of this abuse can be delimited.
Lawyers agreed that harassment does not occur in tort cases where the
attorneys are very busy and the type of information that can be sought is
relatively limited. Deliberate harassment is likely to occur, if at all, in
business litigation-private anti-trust cases, stockholders suits, and perhaps
in some copyright, patent, trade mark, and contract cases-where the range
of potentially relevant material can be tremendous.2 5 This study disclosed
longer depositions and more numerous interrogatories in business than in
tort cases. This abuse is likely to occur in cases constituting at the most about
one-fifth of the total case filings in which about one-quarter of the total dis-
covery is done. It has also been suggested that this abuse is probably limited
to multi-judge districts, for lawyers do not care to go to trial before a judge
who has ruled on their discovery abuse.
23. E.g. Heiner v. North American Coal Corp., 3 F.R.D. 64 (W.D. Pa. 1942).
24. Isbrandsten v. Moller, 7 F.R.D. 188 (S.D. N.Y. 1947) ; Butts v. Southern Pacific
Co., 7 F.R.D. 194 (S.D. N.Y. 1947); Sullivan v. Southern Pacific Co., 7 F.R.D. 206
(S.D. N.Y. 1947); Anthony v. RKO Radio Pictures, 8 F.R.D. 422 (S.D. N.Y. 1948);
Solomon v. Teitelbaum, 9 F.R.D. 515 (E.D. N.Y. 1949).
25. For an excellent description of abuse in New York commercial cases see Com-
ment, Tactical Use and Abuse of Depositions under the Federal Rules, 59 YALE L.J. 117
(1949).
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Lawyers could not estimate the extent of abuse in these cases and hesitated
to suggest remedies that would interfere with the advantages of full disclosure
in discovery. They pointed out that deliberate harassment is self-limiting in
that it is expensive and time consuming for the harassing side and is likely to
make an unfavorable impression upon the judge and jury. One article suggests
that court approval be required for depositions of more than five days dura-
tion.28 Such a limit would not reach harassment by taking scores of short
depositions. Any limitation ought to apply to the whole program of deposi-
tions and discovery. Ultimately curtailment of abuse must depend upon the
alertness of judges in recognizing harassment and their firmness in enforcing
the responsibilities of lawyers as officers of the court.
Lawyers do race for priority in discovery, apparently more in New York
than in other districts. The defendant's initial advantage is one of priority.
It is perhaps offset to some extent by the fact that the plaintiff with ample
time to investigate the facts and law before filing suit can make his own
initial use of discovery extremely effective by trapping the defendant with
carefully loaded questions. One attorney suggested that priority be given
to the party with the burden of proof on most of the issues. The practice
of giving priority to the party first initiating discovery is not expressly
required by the rules and even as stated in opinions is subject to variation
for "special circumstances." 27 Perhaps as judges become more aware of
the possibility of discovery abuse, "exceptional circumstances" may be more
frequently relied on to justify deviation from the rule of first-to-seek first-
to-discover.
Lawyers generally agreed that where abuse was occurring relief could
not be obtained from judges, either because judges could not learn enough
about the case at the pre-trial stage to rule effectively or because of trouble,
expense, and delay in obtaining relief. Although published court opinions
indicate that judges are discriminating in ordering discovery, many lawyers
believe that judges will generally order all the discovery asked. Nevertheless,
the substantial number of discovery motions on the calendars indicates that
most lawyers have apparently not given up hope of court relief.
Some lawyers also felt that rulings on discovery were not uniform and
that inconsistency prevented development of voluntary practices for the
exchange of information. Whether this belief is justified could not be
determined. The crucial discovery rules turning around "relevant to the
subject matter," the qualified privilege of counsel under Hicknmn v. Taylor,
26. See Comment supra note 25, at 133.
27. MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTIcE §26.13 (1950); Hillside Amusement Co. v. Warner
Bros. Pictures, Inc., 2 F.R.D. 275 (S.D. N.Y. 1942); Ginsberg v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc., 6 F.R.D. 371 (S.D. N.Y. 1945); Forstmann Woolen Co. v. Manufacturers
Retail Men's Stores, Inc., 6 F.R.D. 224 (S.D. N.Y. 1946); Mutual Finance Corp. v.
Sobol, 7 F.R.D. 111 (S.D. N.Y. 1946); Hare v. Southern Pacific Co., 9 F.R.D. 307
(N.D. N.Y. 1949); Edwin H. Morris & Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 10 F.R.D.
236 (S.D. N.Y. 1950).
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and "good cause" are necessarily and deliberately indefinite. The com-
plaining lawyers were perhaps insensitive to distinctions between cases and
obsessed with a desire for certainty at the expense of flexibility in decision.
Despite the claim that trial by deposition is making a comeback, trials are
not being heard largely on depositions or other discovery material. Data
already presented from New York, Maryland, and Philadelphia disclosed
the use of depositions in only about one-third of the trials. Use of inter-
rogatories and admissions was rare.28 Although many of the exhibits
may have been obtained by motion to produce, the number so obtained
could not be determined, and their use in evidence is certainly not objection-
able. In none of the trials examined did depositions or other discovery
material constitute the only evidence. Under the limitations of Rule 26(d) (3)
depositions can only be used in circumstances in which it is unlikely that the
witness would be available, i.e., the choice is between deposition evidence
and none at all.
Facilitation of perjury has been a bogey man of discovery for over a
hundred years. No evidence can be produced conclusively to prove or
disprove it,29 and the consensus among lawyers is to reject it.30  This in-
vestigation disclosed the variety of ways in which lawyers use discovery to
thwart perjury. Defendants customarily take a deposition and make a physical
examination of the plaintiff immediately after suit is filed to freeze his
account both of the accident and of his injuries before he has learned too
much about what facts will support his recovery. The answers to inter-
rogatories and admissions, documents obtained by motions to produce, and
testimony on deposition are checked against one another and against testi-
mony at the trial to outwit the perjurer. It has recently been suggested
that perjury can be thwarted by more discovery or by rearrangement of dis-
covery so as to allow time to take depositions before producing statements,
to file documents simultaneously, and to give priority to the party lacking first
hand knowledge of the facts.3 1
The liveliest field of discovery law has recently been that concerned with
disclosure of the other side's trial preparations-the problem of Hickman v.
Taylor. This investigation disclosed that in tort cases lawyers very often
seek discovery of materials that were obtained in preparation for trial or for
possible litigation. In New York, interrogatories in six of 12 FELA cases
and two of 20 Jones Act cases sought such information, and motions to pro-
due in 30 of 36 Jones Act cases and nine of 13 personal injury cases
sought to obtain statements, reports, photographs, etc. probably prepared
28. In addition to the 133 depositions only eight answers to interrogatories and one
admission were introduced in the 150 trials in New York from July 1950 through Decem-
ber 1950.
29. Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 997 (2d. Cir. 1942).
30. Ragland, supra note 5, at 124.
31. Yudkin, supra note 3, at 295.
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in anticipation of litigation. Such discovery is unpopular with defendants'
counsel who fear perjury and dislike the use of their preparations by the
other side. They particularly dislike being obliged to produce statements of
witnesses who are known and available on the plea that plaintiff lacks means
to interview them or take their depositions, because plaintiff's counsel is usual-
ly financing the case and can interview or take depositions if he thinks it really
worth while. But even such understandable criticism cannot outweigh the
desirability, in the administration of justice, of having all possible information
in the hands of both parties, unless such disclosure results in deterioration
of investigation and trial preparations. There were only hints of such results:
one suggestion that certain materials were no longer kept in the attorney's
file because they might be producible; another indication that the formal
reports of ship officers no longer told the whole truth but were supplemented
by letters or conversations. Wholesale disclosure of trial preparations and of
accident reports may sometime either interfere with adequate preparation
or reduce the effectiveness of accident prevention investigation. But disclosure
is not so unrestricted, and there is no evidence that careful trial preparation
and investigation are not still worthwhile.
Is Discovery Bearing Out the Hopes of Its Proponents?
Court opinions show that discovery is being relied upon to fill out the details
of pleadings. This study has described examples of such use, particularly of
the interrogatory, to gain information on contentions and to push aside
frivolous allegations.
Discovery does not appear to have been successful in speeding the disposi-
tion of cases, for instead the courts seem to have taken over a larger share
of the burden of investigation. A comparison between cases with and without
discovery in Chicago and Maryland disclosed that discovery is associated both
with the cases which take longer to dispose of and with cases which more often
go to trial. Moreover, the large number of objections to discovery on the mo-
tion calendars indicates that, to some extent, motion maneuvers formerly
directed toward pleadings have been transferred to discovery. Yet, especially
in big cases, the opportunity to get at all the evidence well before trial does
facilitate the organization of trial evidence and should shorten trials.
Finally, discovery does appear to have fulfilled expectations in making
information and evidence readily available to all parties. It is popular and
employed extensively. The use of discovery devices has given effect to sub-
stantive rights in both tort and business litigations. Without liberal discovery
thousands of parties would each year be unable to substantiate their legal
rights.
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